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I. Introduction
One of the major issues in the study of development economics today is the effect natural
resources have on economic growth. It would seem intuitive that great natural resource wealth
would lead to economic growth, as an abundance of natural resources would increase the overall
wealth and purchasing power of a nation. Yet a cursory look at the nations of the world does not
support this idea. Countries like Nigeria, while extremely rich in natural resources, are economic
basket cases, while countries like Japan and South Korea, while relatively resource poor, have
experienced extremely rapid growth over the past few decades. This disparity has led economists
and academics of all sorts to wonder whether in fact there is an inverse causal relationship
between a country’s national resource wealth and its economic growth: a “natural resource
curse.”
Recent interest in the relationship between natural resources and growth was sparked by a
widely read set of papers by Sachs and Warner. Throughout the mid 90s, they published a series
of papers in which they made the case for the existence of a “natural resource curse”. In these,
they showed that, on aggregate, there is a negative relationship between the size of an economy’s
natural resource sector and its economic growth rates over the past few years.
There is a great deal of cross-country work bearing on the resource curse but very few
studies have used within country variation to test the variety of hypotheses linking natural
resources and growth. For example, are states that have a historic dependence on mining, such as
West Virginia and Alaska, more likely to have sustained lesser growth than states such as
California or Washington State, which do not have such a dependence? This is a difficult
question to answer, in part because of the fact that labor mobility exists between U.S. states to a
degree that it does not between separate nations. Such mobility creates a channel by which
increases in wages atrract migration, increasing population and lowering estimates of
GDP/Capita. This paper looks at data on natural resources and GDP/Capita over the period
between 1970-1999 and shows that, when spatial equilibrium dynamics are accounted for, there
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is evidence that may support the existence of a natural resource curse of sorts within the United
States.

II. Literature Review.
The current incarnation of the debate over the existence of a natural resource curse began
with the publishing of Sachs and Warner’s 1995 working paper Natural Resource Abundance
and Economic Growth. In this paper, Sachs and Warner documented the relationship between
the share of natural resources in a country’s economy and its overall growth rates. Their results
formed the basis for the idea of the natural resource curse as applies to development. Over the
past few decades, Sachs and Warner published several papers that expanded on their thesis. In a
summarization of their work, Sachs and Warner (2001) show results that expressed strong
evidence for the existence of a natural resource curse. The basic methodology they adopted was
to run a standard cross-country growth regression, then adding in a natural resource abundance
variable to see its partial effect on economic growth. They defined this variable as the ratio of
exports of primary resources divided by total exports, as well as several controlling variables that
others have proposed as potential explanations of growth rates. In every regression, they found a
statistically significant negative relationship between growth and natural resource abundance.
Sachs and Warner(1995) also ran many other regressions controlling for up to 14
different potential determinants of growth, such as corruption and other political factors. The
results of these regressions all supported their initial hypothesis of a natural resource curse.
While this at first seems fairly convincing, upon further examination, the assumptions of
Sachs and Warner raise some questions. Mainly, their measurement of natural resource
dependence is defined as the total share of primary exports over total exports, or SXP as they call
it in Sachs and Warner (1995.) Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke(2009) convincingly argue that a
country that in a country experiencing low growth and economic dysfunction, natural resources
will be the last export industry standing since it is an industry that requires less human capital
and Total Factor Productivity than manufacturing. Thus, one could argue that a predominantly
resource driven export sector is in fact a symptom of low growth, rather than a cause. Thus,
because of their measure of natural resources abundance, Sachs and Warner’s estimates may be
plagued by endogeneity if causality runs the opposite way. Therefore, measuring the inherent
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natural resource wealth of a country and determining its effect on growth may have greater
explanatory power. This would help to assuage endogeneity concerns, because the natural
resource wealth of a country, unlike the size of its export sector, is randomly distributed, and
unaffected by any sort of political factors.
Brunschweiller and Bulte (2008) made this argument in a 2008 paper that referred to the
Natural Resource Curse, as commonly understood, as a complete red herring. They criticized
Sachs and Warner’s use of the share of natural resources in total exports as a poor measure of
natural resource wealth, claiming that a dependence on natural resources was endogenous. They
instead introduced a new measure of natural resource abundance, which was based on data from
a World Bank study on the natural resource wealth of different countries (World Bank, 1997.)
This study used as its explanatory variable the net present value in 2004 of an aggregate of
mineral, oil, and other general types of natural resource wealth. This was a superior explanatory
variable to use than Sachs and Warner’s use of export share, because unlike resource
dependence, which is very likely not distributed randomly and independent of other policies, the
amount of natural resources a country is naturally endowed with is a function of natural
geography and thus uncorrelated with any of the other determinants of growth.
This change in methodology attracted considerable attention. Up until then, according to
Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke(2009) most of the literature tended to use the terms dependence
and abundance interchangeably. The work of Brunschweiller and Bulte(2008) underscores the
importance of distinguishing between a natural abundance of resources rather than the
dependence of resources. Most recent assessments of the Resource Curse (Van der Ploeg, 2009,
Bond and Malik 2009,) have taken care to distinguish between natural resource dependence vs.
abundance in their methodology. Unfortunately, due to the limited nature of the World Bank
data, particularly the difficulty in accurately measuring mineral deposits (Van der Ploeg, 2009)
as well as lack of availability for several different countries, it is dubious whether this measure
accurately represents the total natural resource endowment of a country. As a result, most of the
literature still uses Natural Resource Dependence, since it is much easier to quantify, but the
potential endogeneity remains a challenge to studies using such measures.
When trying to apply the logic of the natural resource curse to U.S. states, past work by
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2006), as well as this paper, will be using the Sachs and Warner estimate
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of Resource Dependence, rather than the Brunschweiller and Bolte measure of Resource
Abundance, to assess the existence of the curse. The reason for this is twofold. One is that data
for the traditional Sachs and Warner style estimate is much easier to find. The other is that,
within U.S. states, specialization in natural resources is, on the face of it, less of an automatic
indication of all of the other sectors having fled. After all, within a country like the U.S, with
perfect capital mobility and free trade between states, specialization in a particular sector might
not be as damaging a strategy as it would be for an entire country. In addition, labor mobility
between state borders is much more fluid than between national borders.
There are many different channels through which natural resources themselves have the
potential to impact the growth of the economy. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) established that the
excessive price volatility of natural resources leads to excessive volatility of the GDP growth rate
in countries dependent on natural resources. They also establish a channel by which
overinvestment in natural resources crowds out other industries. Thus, when the price of
whatever natural resource a country is dependent on falls, overall revenues fall and the state is
unable to shift resources to other industries to make up for the shortfall. Thus, GDP/Capita
would fluctuate with the price of the natural resource, which tends to be very volatile. This
volatility, in turn is responsible for the drop in GDP/Capita. Ramey and Ramey (2004) show
strong support for the idea that high volatility in GDP/Capita leads to a sharp decrease in growth
rates for countries. They show that that volatility leads to uncertainty, which tends to depress
factors like investment that lead to high growth.
Building on the work of Ramey and Ramey (2004) and Koren and Tenreyro(2007) Van
der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) ran regressions in order to show that volatility was the key
channel through which a dependence on natural resources handled economic growth. They were
able to find statistically significant negative correlations between standard deviation of growth,
which was their measure of volatility, and growth. This provided support for Ramey and
Ramey(2004) and Koren and Tenreyro(2007). It also established a channeeld bt which
dependence on natural resources for economic activity will result in high volatility of output,
which will lead to higher uncertainty, which will discourage the rate of investment and lead to
low growth.
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This conclusion was challenged by Malik and Bond(2009), who sought to see if there
was a direct connection between natural resource abundance and investment. Ultimately, they
did not find such a connection, arguing, in an analysis that would support the conclusions of
Lederman and Maloney(2007), that it is the specific structure of exports, i.e. how the different
exports are proportioned, that determines investment, and thus has consequences for growth.
However, it is worth noting that a strong emphasis of a country on a particular resource sector
can increase the potential for rent seeking. One of the key findings of both Malik and
Bond(2009) and Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke(2009) is that the negative effects of natural
resources on growth tend to be strongest when they are associated with other potential
impediments to growth. One theme that is particularly recurrent is that natural resources tend to
amplify the negative effects of bad government and corruption on the growth process. The
papers mentioned above have mostly found the strongest affects of natural resources on growth
are found when accounting for these variables.
One of the main variables that literature on the Natural Resource Curse deals with is the
effect that Natural Resources have on growth as a result of social and political institutions.
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) theorize that rents from natural resources tend to increase the
corruption in an economy and thus depress economic growth, but with the contingency that this
effect differs based on the quality of the democratic institutions in that country. Thus, a country
with strong, high functioning democratic institutions will not experience corruption due to a
natural resource boom. As their main explanatory variable, they use Resource Rents, defined as
the difference between a commodity’s world market price and its extraction costs. The use of
rents avoids the problems with following the Sachs and Warner methodology described earlier.
Basically, they argue that a game develops between politicians and the populace of a given
country. They argue that essentially, there are good and bad politicians, good politicians
basically being ones who try to look out for the welfare of the economy and bad politicians who
are only self-interested. It is in the interest of a bad politician to appropriate as much profit for
himself from the resource rents, but he also must stay in power, and thus to do so must restrain
his greed and mimic a good politician in order to gain the support of the populace. The extent to
which he can do this is based on the strength of the democratic institutions in those areas.
Others have argued that the determining factors of whether or not Natural Resources are a
curse depend on the political and institutional effects of heterogeneity. Hodler(2006) describes a
5

model by which fractionalized countries suffer from an increase in natural resources, where as
more homogenized countries are able to use the natural resources as a blessing. His principal
model suggests that in fractionalized countries natural resources serve as a sort of prize that the
different groups will fight over. Thus, a resource bonanza such as an oil boom will lead to
increased rent seeking and fighting between different groups, which will discourage investment
and dampen growth. Using many different measures of fractionalization, including linguistic,
ethnic, and religious measures, he regressed GDP/Capita on Natural Resource Abundance, using
the World Bank measures of resource abundance rather than Sachs and Warner estimates of
resource dependence, and comes up with strong results confirming his hypothesis. These results
show that countries with relatively homogenous populations tend to experience income increases
in response to resource booms, but that countries that heterogeneous do not. This explanation
goes a long way to explaining obvious exceptions to the natural resource curse, such as Norway,
which in addition to having a dominant share of their economy devoted to resource exports, has a
very high standard of living. This ceases to become a mystery when fractionalization is
introduced, due to Norway’s high degree of homogeneity among the populace.
In addition to being contingent on democratic and demographic factors of countries, other
work has argued that these factors can interact in a certain sense. Thus the question at hand,
many have argued, is not whether or not a state has a strong democracy, but as to the exact
nature and setup of the democracy. Recent work by Andersen and Aslaksen (2007) has looked at
whether presidential or parliamentary democracies are more likely to fall prey to a natural
resource curse. They also look at the dimension of whether or not a country favors a majoritarian
or proportional method of voting to elect their leaders.
The logic behind this is that parliamentary forms of governments, in order to be effective,
must create broad coalitions among most of the interest groups in the population in order to
maintain power. According to theoretical work by Perrson and Tabellini(2004), the propensity of
government to engage in equal spending amongst the general public as opposed to targeting
specific special interest groups is reinforced by the ability that parliaments have to cast a vote of
no confidence in their executive. Thus if a parliamentary country were to receive a resource
boon, the gains in welfare would be likely to be distributed across the population, which would
increase the overall welfare and growth of GDP per capita.
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As far as these political factors are concerned, it is not hard to see that an analysis of the
United States alone would control for most of these political factors. The United States is not a
country that is famous for experiencing a great deal of ethnic sectarian violent conflict, at least
not at the scale experienced by many African nations, and thus, this is not likely to be a factor. In
addition, all U.S. states share more or less the same political institutions at a state level, and
identical institutions at the Federal Level. Thus, the nature of the rent seeking would be very
different, and factors such as, for example, the presidential vs. parliamentary makeup of the
executive branch described above would not be a factor worthy of consideration. To be sure,
there do exist differences in state level governing practices, but these are smaller and more
nebulous than the differences that exist between countries. Nevertheless, it is possible that states
with more of a natural resource sector could seek rent through congressional lobbying. However,
comparing states by different levels of corruption would prove to be quite difficult, as Papyrakis
and Gerlagh (2006) have found.
Work by Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2006) has focused on additional potential channels for
the Natural Resource Curse to operate at the state level. One is education, the idea that states
with an emphasis on Natural Resources are less likely to invest in education, due to their focus
on employing laborers for primary resource extraction, which could impede their abilities to
develop more knowledge based growth sectors in the future. They make a similar argument for
the Research and Development sector. However, their regressions in general found that, while
states that underinvested in these sectors did indeed experience negative growth as a result, these
were more likely related to policy failures independent of any Natural Resource Curse. A
problem with their study, however, was their lack of data, as their data only goes back as far as
1986. This study, however, will be analyzing data as far back as 1970.
The channel that we are trying to investigate for the purposes of this paper is the Dutch
disease channel. The proposed channel basically works through a few channels. One is that a
sudden boom in natural resources leads to an appreciation of a country’s currency, leading its
citizens to prefer domestic consumption. This causes an underinvestment in the export sector as
well as a decrease in foreign investment, which could be detrimental to future growth. This
channel is not likely to be a factor when comparing U.S. states against each other, since they all
share the same currency.
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The other Dutch disease channel works as follows: A discovery of natural resources in a
country or state causes an overinvestment in the natural resource sector, which leads to
investment in the natural resource sector instead of sectors that are conducive to long run growth.
This leads to a decrease in Total Factor Productivity, or TFP, which is an important factor in the
Solow growth model that is vital for continued growth. This decrease in productivity is
reflected in a diminished growth rate of the GDP, and thus, the GDP/Capita. However, the initial
boom of natural resources would also lead to an increase in wages, which in the context of a
cross-country analysis, would lead to an increase in the wages for existing workers. In United
States, there are no barriers, other than basic geography, to prevent workers from moving from
states with low wages to states with high wages. Therefore, it is possible that the share of Natural
Resources in GDP would actually have a negative effect on GDP/Capita due to an increase in the
overall population of the state, rather than merely a decrease in productivity.
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III. Data and Methodology.
Primarily, we are concerned with whether overinvesting in Natural Resources has a
negative effect on TFP growth, which would in turn lead to a long term decrease in the rate of
economic growth.
We use a measure similar to that of Sachs and Warner. The independent variable we will
be using, NATSHARE, is composed of dividing the total output of the mining sector by the total
industrial output of the state, or GDP. We have chosen to use the mining sector to represent the
natural resource dependence of a state for a variety of reasons. One is that it provides the
clearest example of the Dutch Disease phenomenon, as the presence of mineral deposits or oil is
one of the clearest examples of a commodity which does not require much innovation or TFP
growth to develop. It merely must be extracted from the ground and sold in crude form. The
other reason is that the NAICS and SIC definitions of the mining sector are nearly identical, so
this would preclude a conversion between systems, simplifying the construction of a longer
dataset.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis maintained by the Department of Commerce compiles
statistics on the composition of United States Gross Domestic Product by State. From their
online database we were able to obtain data on the size on the composition of the GDP of each
U.S. state and use it to construct our variable NATSHARE. This data is classified according to
two systems: SIC and NAICS. The SIC classification covers the time period from 1967-1997
and the NAICS system covers data from 1997-present. For our regressions, we will be testing the
years from 1970-1999. We chose 1970 in 1967 because we needed to use U.S. census estimates
for population data, which are measured on the decade.
From this BEA data, we were able to construct the variable NATSHARE by dividing the
size of the SIC and NAICS Industry classification “Mining” by the total industrial output. This
measure includes both the extraction and refinement of both minerals and oil.
We can start out by running a basic growth regression on the log of GDP/Capita in 1999
on the NATSHARE variable that we have developed. In the following graph, the growth rate of
GDP/Capita is plotted against the Mining share of GDP in 1970.

9

.025
.015

.02

Delaware
Connecticut
Georgia
South
Dakota
New
Hampshire
Colorado
Massachusetts
Virginia
North
Carolina
South
Carolina
Tennessee
Arkansas
New Jersey
Minnesota
North DakotaUtah
Washington
Texas
Wisconsin
Alabama
Mississippi
Kansas
Maryland
Nebraska
Rhode
Island
Maine
Oregon
Indiana
Florida
Missouri
Iowa
Kentucky
Arizona
Pennsylvania
Illinois
New
York
California
Ohio
Vermont
Michigan
Oklahoma
Idaho

New Mexico
Louisiana

.01

Nevada
Montana

Wyoming

West Virginia

.005

Hawaii
Alaska

0

.05

.1
.15
Mining share of GDP, 1970
State

.2

.25

Fitted values

From this graph we can see that, while most states did not have a high mining sector to
begin with, there is a clear negative trend associated with the presence of a large reliance on the
Mining Sector.
These results would seem to indicate that there is indeed a statistically significant
negative relationship between the NATSHARE variable and the growth rate of a U.S. state.
However, before accepting these results as an accurate indicator, there are a few sources of bias
that we must address. In addition to potential omitted variable bias, there is also the possibility
that this is merely evidence of convergence. One of the main feature of the Solow growth model
is that the growth rates of less developed economies tend to be higher than the growth rates of
more developed economies. To account for this possibility, we show in column (2) of Table 1 an
additional regression that was run using the log of state GDP/Capita in 1970 as a controlling
variable. We are controlling for absolute convergence, not conditional convergence because,
following Barro and Sala-I Martin(1991) we assume that within the same country, conditions
are roughly equal, therefore we do not need additional control variables. From these results we
can see that, while there is a statistically significant convergence effect in regression (2), the
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coefficient for NATSHARE in the second regression is still negative, significant, and only
slightly less than in regression (1).

Table 1.
Mining1970/GDP1970

-0.036

-0.033

(0.009)**

(0.009)**

ln(GDP/cap)1970

-0.008
(0.003)*

Constant
R2
Observations

0.017

0.093

(0.001)**

(0.029)**

0.25

0.35

50

50

p<0.05*; ** p<0.01
Table 1. This table shows the results of regressions of GDP/Capita growth from 1970-1999
on several explanatory variables. the Mining/GDP measure is constructed from NAICS and SIC estimates for size of the mining sector
in 1970. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses, with asterisks(*) denoting significance level.

When applying the Natural Resource Curse logic to states, rather than countries, there are
a few considerations that must be taken into account. One is that as established by Glaesar and
Gottlieb, states are in a spatial equilibrium with regards to both Labor and Capital flows.
To account for this spatial equilibrium, we adopt the methodology specified by Glaesar
and Gottlieb(2009), which they developed from earlier work by Rosen (1979) and Roback
(1982), in order to determine how natural resource dependence affects the Total Factor
Productivity of a regional economy.
Like Glaesar and Gottlieb, our analysis starts with the typical production function used by
growth Economists: AitKαL1-α, a Cobb-Douglas production function where K represents capital,
L represents labor and A represents Total Factor Productivity. Like Glaesar and Gottlieb(2009),
we will be making the simplifying assumption of considering L to be composed of both skilled
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and unskilled labor.1 We also follow their methodology in assuming that total capital K is a
geometric weighted average of non-traded and traded capital, so that total output is
Ait KNαγKT1-αγ L1-α. In this equation KN represents non-traded capital and KT represents traded
capital.
According to Glaesar and Gottlieb, The assumption of spatial equilibrium between states
means that at any given time the number of workers (population) in a state is subject to the
following equality condition:
θit GTβGN1-β = θitWit(Pit)β-1
where θ is amenities, GT is the consumption of traded goods, GN is the consumption of nontraded goods, W is wages, and P is prices, and β represents the share of traded goods in total
utility. The basic idea is that workers derive utility from their real wage, which is to say that they
prefers to live in a place where the ratio of their nominal wages to the nominal price of goods in
the area is the highest. The above equation indicates that a worker must be living in a place
where their consumption of goods and amenities is equal to the amount of goods and amenities
they can buy with their real wage. This is important to our United States framework because it
indicates that if there is an increase in the real wage available to a worker in any given state that
he does not live in, he will move to that state. This could potentially skew the results from our
previous regressions, as an increase in the Total Factor Productivity of a state would cause an
increase in wages, which would cause an increase in population, which would negatively affect
GDP/Capita due to an increase in the population.
From the above equations, Glaesar and Gottlieb basically formulate three main
equations that can be used to solve for population, wages, and the prices of non-traded goods.
These equations are reproduced here:
(1)
(2)
(3)
These equations show that the equilibrium conditions for population, wages, and the prices of
goods are dependent on state level TFP, in addition to other factors. This is because increasing
1

Glaesar and Gottlieb page 991
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TFP leads to increasing wages, which attracts more workers, which leads to an increase in
population, which ultimately leads to an increase in the demand for goods and amenities in the
area, which raises prices. The effect of TFP on these parameters is represented by the λA
variables in the above equations. To determine any detrimental effects of natural resources on
the growth of state real wages, which ultimately is the measure of welfare that previous and
current natural resource literature is concerned with, the main question we must answer is: What
effect does a natural resource boom have on total factor productivity?
Glaesar and Gottlieb provide a methodology to determine this measure. From the
previous equations, Glaesar and Gottlieb show that one can calculate δA, the total effect of any
variable Xti , which in our case is NATSHARE, the share of natural resources in total exports,
on the productivity of the traded goods sector.
=
where

and

(4)

are the population and wage coefficients obtained from regressions of wages

and population on the natural resource share .Basically, an increase in TFP leads to a growth in
both population and wages. By looking at the effect of natural resources and wages, we can use
the above equation to infer the effect of Natural Resources on TFP. In addition, we can assume
that when we take the derivative of equation 4, the same equation will also apply to the growth
rates of

,

, and

In order to determine the amount by which the share of natural resources

affects the growth of the productivity of the non-traded sector, we will run regressions of the
growth rates of GDP/Capita and growth rate of population over the period form 1970-1999 on
the variable NATSHARE, the share of mining in GDP at the beginning of the period. We use
five year averages instead of yearly ones in order to control for any changes in population or
GDP that may be due to natural fluctuations from the business cycle. We also calculate this
measure for the growth rate of the entire 30 year period from 1970-1999. This estimate should
show us the amount by which the share or mining in GDP affects the TFP growth of the state.
The estimates for δA can be seen in Table 2.
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Table 2.
Entire Period
δA

70-99

-0.02759
(0.0076)**

Five year Intervals
δA

70-74

0.084
(0.0281)**

δA 75-79

0.0412
(0.013)**

δA 80-84

-0.0692
(0.0120)**

δA 85-89

-0.133
(0.0104)**

δA 90-94

-0.0746
(0.0209)**

δA 95-99

-0.124
(0.0209)**

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Table 2. This table shows five year average measures of δA, which is the effect of the mining sector on TFP growth. Standard errors
are in parentheses. The measure of δA the entire 30 year period is shown at the top. See how natural resource investement share had a
positive effect on TFP growth in the 1970s, but a negative one from 1980-1999, whereas overall, the cumulative effect over the 30
year period is negative.
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IV. Results.
Following the methods of Glaesar and Gottlieb, and with the assumption that their
formula can be applied to growth rates, we have found results that suggested that having a large
natural resource sector had substantial, positive effects on TFP growth for the period from 19701974 and 1975-1979, but then had significant negative effects after that. Overall, from the period
1970-1999, the effect of a large resource sector on TFP growth was negative.
It is interesting to note that these numbers reflect the movement of oil prices in this era.
As can be seen in the following chart, in the 1970s, oil prices were high due to the oil shocks that
were a result of the various OPEC oil embargoes of that era, whereas from 1980 on, oil prices
dropped significantly and stayed low until the early 2000s. These movements can be seen in
Figure 1 below. Thus it would seem that TFP growth attributable to the mining and oil sector
follows the price of oil quite nicely. As the price of oil grows, so grows TFP, and as it falls, the
growth rate of TFP does as well. Over the entire 30 year period we can see that the effect of
natural resource dependence on TFP growth is negative. So does it follow then, that the effect of
natural resource dependence of TFP growth is dependent entirely on the prices of the goods in
question?
From our data at least, this seems likely. This would indicate that natural resource
dependent states are overinvested in natural resources to the point where they cannot replace the
loss in economic activity caused by falling prices. It also indicates that the only benefits that can
be accrued from the harvest of natural resources are those that are directly obtained from selling
them. Thus for long term growth, perhaps it is not beneficial for states to depend so heavily on
natural resources.
It is important to note that there are a plethora of other variables that are influenced by
the natural resource curse that we were not able to account for. Factors such as corruption and
local variation between political practices are much harder to quantify at the state level, yet
previous research at the national level has indicated that they may indeed play a large role.
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It is also worth noting that there are a few factors potentially biasing our results. We were
only able to analyze the mining sector, due to limitations on available data and there are other
sectors of the economy to consider as well, such as timber and other primary resources.
Therefore it is possible that the high correlation we see between our results and the price of oil is
due to the large presence of oil within the composition of our explanatory variable. Nevertheless,
even supposing that oil were the only resource that had this negative effect, this would still have
significant implications. This is because oil is clearly one of the most integral commodities of the
modern developed economy, and many states must often make policy on how best to exploit it.

Figure 1.

http://zfacts.com/p/847.html

This graph shows the movement of real oil prices over the period from 1960-2008. Note that the decline of oil prices occurs in the period 19801984, the first period in our sample for which TFP growth attributable to NATSHARE is negative.
Source: Energy Information Administration.

V. Conclusions
From this data, we see clear results that there is a clear negative effect overall on the size
of a state’s oil and mining sector and the growth rate in TFP for this state. Yet from our more
focused analysis of the five year periods, we also see that this relationship seems to be in part,
based largely on the price of oil. When oil prices are high, there appears to be an overall positive
relationship between the TFP growth of a state and the size of the natural resource sector, when
oil prices are low, a negative one.
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This lends support to the theory that overall, an investment in the natural resource sector
can have a negative effect on TFP growth because it is so highly dependent on the price of the
good in question. As Van der Ploegg and Poelhekke(2009) argue, this volatility could lead to an
overall decrease in investment, which could lead to long term decreases in growth. The channel
provided by Koren and Tenreyro (2007) may also apply here. If the fortunes of a state are too
highly tied to the price of one commodity, then they will overinvest in this commodity when
prices are high, to the point where they will not be able to make up for the shortfall in revenues
and economic activity when prices are low. thus, by being tied disproportionately to one very
volatile commodity, their fortunes will ebb and flow with the prices of this commodity, making
consistent investment and TFP growth unlikely. A well diversified state, on the other hand,
would be able to switch focus to other industries to make up for the shortcoming. This would
allow other economic activity to occur that would enable the growth of TFP.
Thus it is possible, that, at least in regards to oil and mining, a sort of natural resource
curse does apply to U.S. states. An overinvestment in oil during times when prices were high
may lead to an inability to switch resources to production of other goods when prices are low,
thus leading to a long term overall depression in growth.
This raises questions about several relevant policy issues. Should state governments
discourage or encourage further expansion of drilling and oil production? Should the
governments of states with large natural resource wealth take measures to abate increasing
dependence on such wealth? Our data would suggest that perhaps they should.
Further research should focus on an analysis of other sectors as well as oil and mining. It
should also seek to apply the spatial equilibrium assumptions we have used here to regressions of
data that include other controlling variables, such as political factors and the size of sectors such
as research and development and the other control variables used by Papyrakis and
Gerlagh(2006). As mentioned previously in the literature review, the strongest results nationally
came from combining the Dutch disease channels with explanatory variables based on political
factors, and it would be interesting to see whether this holds true for U.S. states. For example,
does rent seeking by oil companies themselves account for the overinvestment in natural
resources? It would also be worthwhile to determine how much a lack of growth in some U.S.
states affects the well-being of the nation as a whole.
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VI. Data Appendix
For data on state- by- state GDP in the years 1963-2008 I have used the NAICS and SIC
measures of GDP in current dollars. The SIC data ends in 1997 and is replaced by the NAICS
data for the same period.
We obtained data on population from the United States Census. We obtained this data
using the Center for Disease Control’s websites at http://www.cdc.gov/.
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Our measure of the independent variable NATSHARE is constructed from the NAICS
and SIC measure for mining output. This measure is defined in both systems as “all
establishments primarily engaged in mining. The term mining is used in the broad sense to
include the extraction of minerals occurring naturally: solids, such as coal and ores; liquids, such
as crude petroleum; and gases such as natural gas. The term mining is also used in the broad
sense to include quarrying, well operations, milling (e.g., crushing, screening, washing,
flotation), and other preparation customarily done at the mine site, or as a part of mining
activity.”2
In order to express the dollar estimates for both GDP/Capita and NATSHARE in real
terms, we have used CPI annual average estimates compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor
Bureau of Labor and statistics obtained from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt
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